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ABSTRACT
This study examines the decision making process undertaken
by public sector authorities in developing resource recovery
facilities. The actual development practices of three such
facilities are compared to other approaches gleaned from a
literature search of recent project developments and decision
making frameworks.
Specifically, these minicases are used as tools to isolate
specific factors that most influenced the development of these
environmentally and politically controversial facilities. The
case studies point to the complexities inherent in the
development process and provide insight into the critical role
government must play, especially at the state and local levels,
to ensure successful implementation of a project.
The principal conclusion of this research is as more state
and local governments develop regulatory frameworks requiring
regional solutions to the solid waste disposal problem, the
trend toward municipal development and ownership will increase.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jerome Rothenberg
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INTRODUCTION
The disposal of solid waste is rapidly approaching a crisis
point for many communities. In 1988, the United States
generated and disposed of over 170 million tons of solid waste.
It is projected that by 1993, 185 million tons will be
generated, and by the year 2000, 205 million tons. The volume
of solid waste will continue to increase for several reasons.
The population will expand, consumers will continue to prefer
disposable goods over reusables, and favorable economic growth
in the 1990's will increase overall income and personal
consumption expenditures, which eventually end up in the waste
stream (Martineau, Weizer, 1989).
The most frequently used method of solid waste disposal is
landfilling. Cities and towns in the United States still
deposit 85% of their solid waste in landfills. According to the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, by 1990, more than half of all
municipalities will run out of landfill space. As the capacity
of landfills declines, the cost of the remaining space
increases. Clearly, landfills have become a valuable resource
which must be conserved. Increasingly, the public recognizes
that policies which regulate the existing facilities should be
reassessed and revised to emphasize the need for conservation
and alternatives to traditional landfilling as the sole form of
solid waste disposal.
The cornerstone of any effective solid waste disposal
system is the development of an integrated waste management
program. Integrated solid waste management sets a clear
priority to reduce and re-use waste rather than to dispose of
it. Such a program targets reduction of the waste produced,
particularly that which is toxic either in production or
disposal, the recycling of appropriate components of the waste
stream, the combustion of the balance of waste stream which
cannot be reduced or recycled, and the landfilling of only those
wastes which cannot reasonably be reduced, recycled, or burned.
Resource recovery is the combustion component of an integrated
system. In this context, a resource recovery facility burns
solid waste and produces energy as a byproduct in the form of
steam or electricity. The waste becomes ash, which is then
landfilled. The combustion process can reduce the raw waste
volume by as much as 90%, thus vastly increasing the lifetime of
existing landfills.
From a historical perspective, resource recovery
facilities were subject to skepticism as a valid solution to the
disposal problem, primarily due to antiquated incinerators which
were susceptible to operational failures. Other factors
included the lack of modern pollution controls to monitor
emissions, and incidences of leachate contamination of aquifers
underlying the landfill. As a result, many communities did not
develop resource recovery facilities. However, in recent years,
implementation of successful facilities have proven that
resource recovery is a technologically viable alternative for
solid waste disposal. In 1988, there were 111 resource recovery
facilities operating or in the process of coming on-line and 91
sites that were in advanced stages of development, e.g. secured
contractual arrangements (Gould, 1988).
As more communities experience problems with handling their
increased volume of solid waste, they increasingly look to
private firms for assistance in developing resource recovery
facilities. These facilities may be operated and owned
privately or publicly, depending on governmental preferences,
market conditions, and other factors. For example,
municipalities may seek long-term arrangements in which an
outside contractor assumes complete responsibility for solid
waste disposal, or they may contract with vendors, under a
management only or consulting basis, to oversee publicly owned
facilities. The level of private participation is one of the
most critical issues for communities considering the development
of a resource recovery facility.
This thesis focuses on the various strategies employed by
municipalities in the Northeast, represented by three regional
agencies, who have implemented resource recovery facilities and
through the process have selected the appropriate level of
private participation.
The first chapter presents an overview of the project
development process and ownership options available for resource
recovery facilities. The organization of planning decisions,
from establishing objectives through to project development was
gleaned from a literature search and provides a structural basis
for the analysis.
The second chapter presents and discusses the factors and
constraints which affect the decision making process during the
developmental stages of a project.
The third chapter contains three minicases. Each case is
a description of the efforts of the municipalities which have
committed to develop a resource recovery facility. Each case
demonstrates how the municipalities evaluated the contractual
alternatives for their facility.
Chapter four analyzes the decision making process of the
three regional authorities with respect to the political,
legislative and environmental constraints. Conclusions about
the case data are developed using the structural framework
outlined in the first and second chapter. The analysis isolates
the critical factors that influenced the selection process.
Chapter five presents conclusions on the development
process based on the minicase analysis and trends identified by
the literature review.
CHAPTER 1
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND FACILITY OWNERSHIP
Communities face a number of major decisions in the
development of long term disposal solutions which include system
technology selection, siting, financial and contractual
structure. The development process is especially susceptible to
risk and uncertainty because, once started, it is relatively
fixed in time and place. The first section of this chapter
presents an overview of the project development process. This
is followed by a description of ownership options which must be
considered prior to implementing a facility.
Section 1
Project Development
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
designated the primary responsibility for the regulation of
solid waste to the state and local levels. Under the Clean Air
Act and other federal legislation, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is empowered to set mandatory guidelines and make
recommendations for the operation of landfills, resource
recovery facilities and recycling facilities.
In general, the unit of state government best equipped to
cope with the solid waste disposal problem is the county or
regional authority. This is especially true in municipalities
which are too small and limited in area and resources to cope
effectively and economically with the problem. Many states have
enacted legislation which require regional solutions to solid
waste management. Such laws require the community to provide a
cost effective means of solid waste disposal for both the
residential and commercial entities. In addition, the community
must ensure long-term solutions and guaranteed levels of service
to their citizens and businesses.
Many communities consider resource recovery facilities an
attractive alternative for solid waste disposal. Resource
recovery facilities by definition process solid waste and
convert it into commercially salable energy as electricity,
refuse derived fuel (RDF), or steam. Recovered materials such
as, scrap steel are also sold. Markets for fly ash to be used
as a building material are currently being developed. The end
product waste, which is reduced by as much as 90% of its
original volume, is an ash residue which must be landfilled.
What are the ingredients of a good project?
-An environmentally suitable site
-A nearby landfill for residue and bypassed waste
-A proven technology and a vendor who will assume
responsibility for its performance
-A long-term contract for the sale of energy
-Long-term contracts for the supply of waste
-Long-term financing at a reasonable cost
An environmentally suitable site for the facility should
provide: good transportation access; compatibility with the
present land use and zoning of the area; topography and
subsurface conditions appropriate for the proposed facility;
adequate land for expansion options; and close proximity to a
point of interconnection with the energy market. The site
should also be free of environmental, site or facility design
impediments which would prevent facility compliance with all of
the approved major permits relating to environmental impact and
solid waste regulations.
The importance of the capacity and proximity of waste
landfill for the residue ash and bypass waste cannot be
underestimated. The designated landfill and its expansion
potential should be sufficient to fulfill the residue and
unprocessed waste disposal needs of the facility throughout the
term of the service agreement, if not the life of the facility.
Development of facilities with proven technologies and
operating systems are more attractive due to the ease with which
their financing can be obtained. Resource recovery facilities
are divided into three basic types:
Mass burn facilities, which burn municipal solid waste as
it is delivered to them, i.e. after recycling has taken
place (Figure 1).
Refuse-derived fuel (RDF) plants, which remove recyclable
materials and shred or process the rest into a uniform fuel
(Figure 2).
Modular facilities, which are similar to mass burn plants
but are usually smaller in size.
With regard to the type of processes being chosen for advanced-
planned and existing projects, 47% are employing mass burn
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technology, 34.2% are using modular incineration and 17.8% are
using RDF technologies (Gould, 1988). Descriptions of major
plant components of both mass burn and RDF technologies are
detailed in Appendix A.
Energy produced from solid waste should be compatible with
existing infrastructural contracts. Typically, the end user is
a private firm, an industrial steam user or the local investor-
owned utility purchasing electric power and energy under a
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) contract. PURPA
requires electric utilities to purchase electricity from
businesses that generate their own power. The price paid is
based on the "avoided cost" of constructing their own generating
plants or buying the electricity elsewhere. Even with PURPA,
the facility must provide some incentive to the customer for the
purchase of energy. Usually, the energy price per BTU is
lower than the energy price of the natural fuel counterpart.
One of the most difficult aspects of project planning is
providing both a reliable and adequate supply of waste.
Furnaces are typically designed for continuous combustion of
waste with the use of auxiliary fuel only during the initial
startup phase. In some localities, the residential waste stream
is controlled by government sponsors. It becomes difficult to
identify and control the waste stream when flow control is
fragmented among various local and commercial entities.
Resource recovery facilities are financed in a variety of
ways. Capital costs for most mass burn and RDF facilities range
from $50 million to $400 million, depending on the plant
capacities. At one end of the spectrum, the project can be
municipally owned and financed with either general obligation or
tax-exempt revenue debt. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
the project can be financed entirely from a private vendor's
equity. Between these two extremes, the combination o.f equity
and debt is largely a factor of ownership and municipal
requirements. Other important factors which influence the
selection of financing include the vendor's creditworthiness,
municipality's credit rating, project economics, vendor's
preference for financing, availability of tax benefits and
availability of state subsidies and grants. Major sources of
capital funds are described in Appendix B.
Section 2
ownership options
Bringing a resource recovery facility into operation as
expeditiously as possible is critically dependent upon the
skills and commitment of public officials involved in designing
and executing the development process. Each resource recovery
project must address a common set of factors, even though the
contracts are project specific. Variations of contractual
structure arise due to the decision makers' perceptions
concerning the probability of risk occurring. Perceptions
differ as a result of diverse economic, political and legal
contexts in which resource recovery projects are undertaken.
Statutes exist in all jurisdictions which govern the
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selection of vendors for public projects. Most communities
favor a competitive procurement process. With public ownership,
the dicta of fairness and open government generally require that
all responsive and responsible parties can compete to provide
the service. Therefore, it is essential that the community have
a well defined selection process. The first step is the
solicitation of interested vendors through the Request for
Qualification (RFQ) process. Qualified vendors are then
selected by the municipality to participate in the Request for
Proposals (RFP) process. The RFP process varies with different
municipalities, but in general, the RFP would define the purpose
and scope of the project, the preferred form of ownership, the
preferred technology, the specifications of performance, and the
risk and liability allocation between the municipality and
developer. An effective RFP would produce comparable proposals,
which would expedite identification, negotiations and resolution
of open issues. It is important to note that consultation with
competent financial, legal, tax, and technical advisors at an
early stage in the development of the RFQ and RFP is a prudent
step in understanding the scope and complexities of implementing
a resource recovery facility.
Upon receipt of proposals, decision makers can then proceed
to fully evaluate and compare the vendors on their ability to
meet the overall solid waste disposal needs, on their pricing,
on their risk posture and on their performance guarantees with
regard to the service agreement. The municipality should
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consider experience, reliability, creditworthiness, guarantees
and other factors, in addition to cost for the service in
choosing a resource recovery vendor.
The successful development of a facility by municipalities
is a tremendous challenge. Preparing for and carrying out
negotiations tests the soundness of the program concept and the
ability of different entities to work together and to resolve
their differences.
Although each contract is project specific, there are
general guidelines which should be followed. The authority
should clearly specify the rights and obligations of all parties
concerning price structure, quantity and quality of service,
length of the contract, and liability coverage. The contract
finalizes these arrangements and establishes the structure of
facility ownership, design, construction and operation. Under
public ownership, most project agreements flow through the
municipal sponsor (Figure 3). Alternatively, most project
agreements flow through the project vendor under private
ownership (Figure 4). However, in the case of public/private
partnerships, project agreements tend to flow through the
municipal sponsor, as in the case of public ownership.
Public ownership offers the municipality traditional
security in having a long term ownership interest in the project
and control of the assets of the project. Communities benefit
from public ownership by retaining direct quality control over
the operation; maintaining their responsibility for waste
disposal; continuing to finance the provisions of the service
through taxes, user fees, or other means; and securing lower
tax free bonds.
Under public ownership, the private vendor designs,
constructs, operates and maintains the facility, and assumes
certain responsibilities that the facility will operate as
expected under a long-term service agreement, typically
extending to 20 years. The contracts specify the technical and
design standards in addition to performance standards. A
private vendor operating a facility under a service agreement
would be locked into a previously negotiated and relatively
fixed revenue stream coming from the project and would have to
control costs in order to achieve operating efficiency and
profitability.
Public ownership of the facility places the community in
the business arena as a seller of manufactured products.
Communities may lack the expertise, especially in marketing,
which could result in the facility's inability to bring revenues
to the community. Thus, the facility would not be a
contributor, but a negative factor to the overall economic base
of the community. Moreover, projects are often beyond the
capability of the local governmental agency to manage in-house.
Municipalities often have political constraints, poor management
or other limitations which prevent cost effective development
and operation of waste disposal services. For example,
municipalities may be slow to respond to technological advances
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due to limited funds available to implement such capital
improvements. Other restrictions which affect the cost of
developing a publicly owned facility include: voter approval of
the project, of the location, and of the financing; public
procurement requirements for designers, architects, engineers,
builders, and contractors; laws requiring use of union labor;
and laws and regulations which impose excessive quality
standards.
In general, public ownership affords the municipality more
control of the project and eliminates the need for the
municipality to pay fair market value for the service at the end
of the service agreement. Tipping fees are typically related to
the amount of service consumed (making them more like market
prices), but may be varied by location and user eligibility. To
this extent, the consumer should be able to realize a portion of
the economic benefit derived from public ownership in the form
of lower user charges. Other community benefits from public
ownership include increased control of the quality and cost of
the service, greater flexibility and increased stability in
providing a long-term service, while enabling the municipality
to stay out of the day to day operations.
Under private ownership, the vendor has a long-term
contract with the municipality to provide a solid waste disposal
service. The service contracts are typically 20 years in
length. The vendor would assume total responsibility for the
design, construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
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The vendor may also assume complete or partial responsibility
for developing and financing the facility. Typically, the
vendor must secure a minimum guaranteed waste flow from
municipalities to qualify for financing. The public sector
determines only the size and performance standards of the
project.
Private ownership can result in significantly lower costs
to the community and improved output by promoting conservation,
efficiency, and prudence in the financing and operation of a
facility. Private ownership also has the advantages of
technology, qualified personnel, decision making authority,
greater investment risk orientation and is buffered from public
disclosure.
A reason often cited for limiting the involvement of
private firms in solid waste management is that they may fail to
comply with the terms of the agreement. This failure may be due
to a variety of factors, ranging from inexperience, poor
management, natural disasters, to substitution of lower quality
resources and deliberate malfeasance (MacAvoy, Stanbury, Yarrow
and Zeckhauser, 1989). Another criticism of private ownership
is that private providers may seek to extract excess profits.
Local governments should seek to avoid "lowballing" on the
initial bid price with the express intention of increasing price
later, explicit acts of bribery, kickbacks or collusive bidding
through carefully specified agreements. Corruption requires
market imperfections, since bribes do not occur in competitive
markets because they are paid from excess profits. Other common
criticisms are the continued and sometimes hidden public
administrative costs associated with monitoring and enforcing
delivery of service and inducing providers to respond to changes
in market conditions. These undesirable outcomes can be
eliminated with proper control of qualified and proven vendors,
special penalties for nonperformance, and special incentives for
superior outputs.
CHAPTER 2
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
The decision making process and degree of involvement of
a given municipality in the development of a resource recovery
facility is often a function of the town's historical
involvement and track record in solid waste management. One of
the key criterion in the development process is the
determination of the level of private participation that best
equates with cost reduction and risk minimization by. the
municipality, while at the same time, allowing the community to
play an active role in the development and control of the
project. Selection of the most effective ownership option
requires a comparison of the cost and the risks associated with
full municipal development, private sector development, and
partial private development.
Many factors must be considered in making the ownership
decision early in the development of a project. Political and
technical considerations tend to be project specific, whereas
institutional, economic and risk allocation factors generally
apply in all development circumstances. The ultimate decision
of facility ownership will be primarily based on an evaluation
of these factors in developing a project to best meet the needs
of participating municipalities. Each of these issues are
detailed below.
Institutional Considerations
The ability of a municipality to organize, fund and
24
contract for the development of a project is fundamental to the
ownership decision. Since the major impetus for private
involvement is derived from the inability or unwillingness of a
community to implement resource recovery facilities, developing
financial and ownership options at the outset is critical.
A community may not have the legal authority to -contract
out, franchise, or form some other agreement with the private
sector. Local competitive procurement laws may preclude the
selection of a project vendor on a negotiated basis.
Legislation may be necessary to allow for a negotiated
procurement or to establish a separate governmental entity such
as a special purpose authority with such procurement powers.
Authorities possess only such powers as have been expressly
granted by law or may be necessarily implied in order to carry
out an expressly granted power. Authorities have incentives,
independent of its reputation and profitability, to consider the
welfare of its customers. Authorities are less constrained than
the rest of the public sector by either budgetary controls or
civil service regulations. Its management is likely to worry
about financial performance since authorities are financed
largely from energy sales, tipping fees, and other revenue.
In states which do not specifically provide for the
establishment of regional authorities for solid waste disposal,
the development process may be politically more cumbersome. In
this case, private ownership may expedite the development of a
project by providing administrative resources to secure
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financing and by serving as the contracting entity for disposal
services between municipalities in a region.
One principal obstacle which arise from general attitudes
and special interests with the populace is referred to as the
Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome. According to the NIMBY
axiom, the majority of citizens accept solid waste as an
inevitable by-product of living and feel little pressure to
control its generation. Citizens oppose landfills, resource
recovery facilities and even recycling centers based on the
perception that these facilities are filthy and odorous, emit
toxic contaminants into the air and water supply, and increase
noisy truck traffic in their neighborhood.
The NIMBY syndrome has prompted many communities to adopt
zoning restrictions against waste disposal facilities. In
densely populated areas, this has made siting of resource
recovery facilities and landfills impossible. While conceding
that a portion of the large domestic solid waste load must be
buried or combusted, environmental groups pressure legislators
to require waste disposal sites to incorporate stringent air and
water pollution controls and restrict the types of waste
handled.
Pressure from the citizenry can result in politicians
adopting a Not-In-My-Election-Year (NIMEY) position on resource
recovery since it is often perceived as a lose-lose issue.
Politicians may also elect to use the solid waste issue as a
political platform.
Economic Considerations
An evaluation of the potential effect of ownership
structure on local finance should be conducted. General
obligations of municipalities are constitutionally limited in
all states, in part, to assure the long-term soundness of their
financial systems. These restrictions on public debt may not
apply if the transaction is characterized as private, which
would result in reduced pressure on local debt capacity.
Therefore, private financing may bypass the constitutional
limitations on debt issuance.
The private sector may be able to take advantage of
financial opportunities and economies not available to the
public sector. Under private ownership, costs savings may
result from construction cost and timing efficiencies, and/or
operational advantages. The cost of a resource recovery project
may be considerably different under public or private ownership
due to tax benefits available to private facility owners.
The availability of tax benefits provides an incentive for
private owners of resource recovery projects to fund a portion
of the total project cost with equity, The private owner's
return on equity is derived from a combination of tax benefits,
energy revenue, tipping fees and the project's residual value.
Risk Allocation Considerations
Regardless of ownership, risks are usually allocated by
utilizing two major criteria: control and reward. The maxim is
that the party who can best control risk, or who stands to gain
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the greatest reward if the risk is not realized, should bear the
burden.
Selecting an ownership structure requires the primary
decision makers to understand what risks they are dealing with:
-What is the source of the risk?
-What are the consequences of the risks?
-What is the probability that an undesirable situation
will occur?
-Which participant is best able to reduce the risk?
-What mechanisms can be used for risk sharing or allocation
of the risk?
Answers to these questions, together with a clear understanding
of the development environment, would enable municipalities to
make the appropriate choice.
The variations in willingness to take risks are an
important element in the decision making process. The following
areas of risk should be considered: developmental; legislative;
technological; supply of solid waste; energy revenues;
construction completion; operational; and force majeure.
Developmental-Developmental risks are often shared between
the municipal sponsor and private vendor. The municipality can
best handle the long-term environmental risks, and thus, often
gain better public acceptance of the project. The impact of
special interest group pressures on the legislature have
resulted in delays and higher costs of siting new landfills,
more stringent landfill controls and regulation of resource
28
recovery operations.
Much of the debate over resource recovery has focused on
dioxins, a group of 75 different chemical compounds, some of
which are harmless and others of which are highly toxic. The
EPA has deemed the dioxin risk from modern resource recovery
facilities as inconsequential, but some scientists have disputed
the conclusion, and further suggest that even small amounts of
toxic releases may show up in the food chains. Predictably, the
absence of a federal dioxin standard has not prevented states or
cities from setting their own standards.
No matter how good the equipment and air pollution controls
are, metals and other potentially toxic compounds still end up
in the ash residue and fly ash. Better air pollution control of
the emissions would paradoxically produce more pollutants in the
fly ash, which is landfilled.
The primary environmental risk of landfills is posed by the
seepage of leachate. Leachate is produced by the passage of
water through buried solid waste. When this occurs, potential
toxicants infiltrate the water and create a substance which can
pollute ground and surface water if not contained. To avoid the
adverse effects of leachate, state-of-the-art landfills
incorporate a number of built-in safety features which minimize
the seepage of water, collect hazardous liquids that penetrate
the layers and monitor the quality of ground and surface water.
Collected leachate is then stored in an appropriate tank and is
periodically transported or piped to a wastewater treatment
facility.
Another potential environmental hazard of landfills occurs
when anaerobic decomposition of buried organic waste results in
the production of methane and carbon dioxide gases. In
particular, methane gas can increase to explosive quantities and
migrate beyond the landfill site boundary, posing serious danger
to surrounding the area. Methane migration is prevented through
a monitoring system comprised of wells which detect the presence
of this gas. In contrast to its risk factors, the natural
production of methane gas from decomposing organic waste can
provide a potential benefit to landfill operators, since it can
be sold to power utilities for conversion into electricity.
The strongest critics of resource recovery say that
virtually no level of risk should be considered acceptable and
argue that massive efforts to reduce and recycle garbage should
take priority. Proponents of resource recovery assert that,
granting the challenge of ash disposal, the technology is safer
than simply burying garbage in landfills.
Legislative-Legislative risk is normally assumed by the
municipality regardless of ownership. Examples of legislative
risk are changes in environmental law and municipal ordinances.
Private owners normally assume the risk of tax law change once
project contracts have been executed.
Technological-Assurances typically must be given that the
equipment will perform as specified. The vendor usually bears
this risk under public or private ownership. One of the common
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problems encountered is the reluctance of vendors to agree to
assume liabilities greater than the value of the equipment
furnished. The municipal sponsor should negotiate a reasonable
value that will enable the retirement of project financing debt
at a minimum.
Completion-Construction completion is normally borne by the
vendor since it is in the best position of any participant to
control the schedule, both from the standpoint of deciding the
schedule and managing it. A fixed price contract with a
specific date for completion should be the objective of the
municipal sponsor. As with technological risk, municipal
sponsors may find a reluctance on the part of vendors to assume
liabilities in excess of the costs for performing the contract.
A vendor's financial completion guarantees should protect
the sponsor against construction risks. Liquidated damages
should be sufficient to meet debt service and operation costs
if the plant does not come on-line on schedule. The vendor must
guarantee the plant will meet air pollution and other
environmental standards.
An owner's contingency plan must be in place from the
start. Typically, time and resources would not be available to
raise additional funds should a problem develop. The
contingency fund is usually 5% of the construction price, but
the fund size will vary with the depth and quality of the
vendor's guarantees, insurance and operating reserves.
Operational-The vendor of a resource recovery facility
under a long-term contract is responsible for competent
operation and maintenance pursuant to appropriate industry
standards regardless of facility ownership. Where the facility
is rendered inoperable or its capacity is derated due to poor
performance, the vendor should bear the cost of rectifying his
mistakes. Operational failures occur when a boiler fails,
revenue commitments are not made, environmental permits are
violated and the facility closes. Contract operators of
municipally owned facilities may be reluctant to accept any
liability for damage in excess of their contracted payments.
Although the vendor will be out of business, the community and
industrial customers are the real losers.
Examples of operational risks are the inability of the
plant to meet design specifications and acceptance tests, and
underestimation of residue quantity or related disposal costs.
Cost of disposal of ash residue and fly ash should be fixed by
long term contract with the landfill.
Acceptance testing determines if the vendor has met his
principal obligation- to design and build a plant that burns
waste and produces power. Failure can result from bad design or
construction, faulty equipment design or installation, building
codes, environmental or other imposed restrictions after
execution of the design contact which limit the facility's
performance. As stated above, the contractor is not responsible
for alterations to accommodate subsequent municipal code changes
without additional compensation.
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Supply of Solid Waste-Municipalities normally guarantee the
contracted quantity of solid waste, under either ownership
approach. Examples of supply risk are failure to deliver waste,
delivery of too much waste, waste delivery stoppages, failure of
waste to meet BTU standards, and introduction of unacceptable
waste including hazardous waste into the waste stream. The
operator's guarantees are important, since introduction of
improper waste could void the construction warranties.
Enercry Revenues-The risk that energy sales do not meet the
projected levels of revenues is subject to negotiation under
either ownership approach. The outcome is dependent upon such
factors as the risk preferences of the negotiating parties,
i.e., who reaps the greatest benefit of energy revenues, and the
ability to negotiate fixed price contracts with the energy
purchaser(s). Currently, there's a movement towards requiring
annual energy output guarantees from vendors to ensure a defined
level of performance.
Force Majeure-Force majeure events or other uncontrollable,
uninsurable risks are protected against by the sponsor to
complete the project and by contingency reserves. Force majeure
events at a minimum, include acts of God, war, civil disorders
and riots. In the event of any of these occurrences, the
construction schedule is usually extended as needed and the
tipping fees are adjusted accordingly.
In projects sponsored by a municipality under any ownership
approach, private vendors will likely accept completion,
technological, and certain operational risks. The municipality
would accept solid waste supply risk, including stipulated
payments for waste shortfalls, and certain energy revenue risks.
Legislative risks (changes in law) and force majeure have
commonly been accepted by municipalities under any ownership
alternative.
In summary, a tightly drawn contract setting out the terms
and conditions for ownership is the most important document of
the contractual process. While private ownership places
significant risk on the vendor, in the final analysis, risk
allocation may not be significantly different under either
ownership approach for a given project. Risk allocation does
not necessarily follow ownership. As a practical matter,
municipal officials will still be held responsible if problems
with a privately owned project occur.
An effort should be made to plan contingencies which avoid
damages. Mitigation of risk is found in: the involvement of
experienced personnel and use of capable engineering support in
design; the tempering of project expectations with' respect to
energy production and sales; a proper understanding of each
party's risks; and an appropriate reserve fund/insurance
package. There exists a point at which the attempt to
anticipate every conceivable future occurrence becomes
dysfunctional. For every day a project is delayed, one or more
of the price components can escalate. If delays do occur, the
project can then become vulnerable to changing market
conditions, changing political climate or changing laws. A
recent survey found that due to significant uncertainties in
federal and state regulatory policies regarding air emissions
and ash disposal, a number of private and public developers have
decided to hold off on planned new facilities (Martineau and
Weizer, 1989).
CHAPTER 3
MINICASES
This chapter focuses on the efforts of three regional
authorities who have undertaken the development of resource
recovery facilities. Each authority was subjected to a detailed
field research protocol to isolate and organize the various
factors that most influenced their implementation process.
Project Selection
A database of the 111 existing resource recovery facilities
and 27 permanently shut down facilities was assembled to
identify the form of ownership, start-up date of operation,
technology used (RDF or mass burn), location and reason for
shutdown. For the existing facilities, public ownership was
selected for 45.9% of the facilities, private ownership
represented 36.1% and public/private partnerships represented
18%. The data illustrates the relatively short history of
resource recovery as a disposal option, 86.5% of the facilities
have come on-line since 1980. In fact, 47.7% of the facilities
have initiated operations since 1985. When compared by regions,
the Northeast shows the greatest share of facilities (36.6%),
primarily due to the region's landfill crisis.
Of the 27 facilities which have shutdown permanently, 40.7%
were publicly owned, 37% were privately owned and public/private
partnerships represented 22.3%. The majority (66.7%) of the
shutdowns resulted from equipment failures or failure to comply
with environmental standards. This was followed by 18.5% due to
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economic reasons, 11.2% were experimental facilities employing
technologies such as pyrolysis and 3.6% due to legal action.
The projects selected for this research represent the scope
of contractual structures which are prevalent today. One
authority chose a private vendor to provide complete services.
Another, acted under legislative mandate to maintain ownership
and to contract with a private vendor under a full service
agreement. The third, chose to maintain ownership and to
contract with a private vendor under a full service contract
without a legislative mandate. A fourth case was considered,
but the Author was unable to obtain adequate data pertaining to
this publicly owned and operated facility which shut down
operations after 3 years due to economic reasons.
The projects were selected from the Northeast, where the
solid waste disposal dilemma is well documented. This also
allowed the researcher to control for a relatively common
environment.
Research Methodology
The three cases presented in this chapter were based on
interviews with public officials, planners, private industry
developers, and citizens who participated in the implementation
process. The interview protocol, which is detailed in Appendix
C, evolved from the review of project development and decision
making criteria established earlier in this study.
Background information concerning the contractual structure
of the facilities was obtained from a wide variety of sources
including official statements for bond issues, trade and
professional journals, local and national media sources. The
research was conducted during a two-month period.
Case One: Millbury, Massachusetts
Communities in the Worcester, Massachusetts area formed a
committee to develop a regional solution to solid waste
management. When Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. (Wheelabrator)
of Danvers, MA. offered to own, finance, design, build, and
operate a resource recovery facility, the Town of Millbury
offered to host the facility within its boundaries. In
exchange, Millbury enjoys free tipping from Wheelabrator for 20
years for a specified amount of waste and receives "host
community fees" each month from the 35 other communities
providing waste to the facility. Wheelabrator sold the facility
to the Ford Motor Credit Company after tax benefits of ownership
were reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), but
Wheelabrator continues to operate it, under a lease agreement
with Ford.
The Central Massachusetts Resource Recovery Committee
(Committee) was formed in 1975 and represented 35 communities.
The Committee received a state grant to develop a strategy for
solid waste management for the region. The City of Worcester,
the second largest city in New England, retained a full-time
administrator through state funding to oversee the Committee's
implementation schedule and to develop a planning framework.
Independent consultants were retained to assist with the
technical and financial evaluation of the solid waste management
strategy. Initially, the City of Worcester considered siting a
facility within its boundaries, but citizen opposition killed
that notion. In 1980, amidst much public pressure, Worcester's
city council passed a resolution which prohibited landfills,
resource recovery facilities and transfer stations from being
sited within city limits. Upon passage of the resolution,
funding for the feasibility studies was withdrawn by the state.
Bob Jacques, Director of Health for the Town of Shrewsbury
commented:
The Board of Selectman of Millbury and especially
Harold Ostrowsky [former Selectman and current Town
Assessor] was the driving force. Millbury offered two
sites for the facility. Their strength and leadership
enabled the Committee to maintain momentum and control
and to diffuse opposition.
There was little time to go through the comprehensive
RFQ/RFP (request for qualifications/proposals) process.
Landfills were approaching capacity in several towns. At the
time, Millbury's landfill had a two year life span and Worcester
was under order by the state environmental authorities to close
its landfill by June 1, 1985. The Committee was interested in
finding a private partner to hasten development of a resource
recovery facility. Jacques the described process:
The Committee had determined that they did not have
the expertise to run the facility and did not have the
ability to respond to outages and shortfalls. In
essence, their objective was to assume as little risk
as possible. They realized that the communities were
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not in the business of making money, only in providing
steady, reliable, long-term service.
Fran Ouillete, Former Chairperson of the Committee explained:
The philosophy of life in central Massachusetts is
that the private sector can do it better. Alot of
communities are closet Republicans having a preference
for government to make [as] much use of private
enterprise [as possible].
Richard Schnorff, City of Worcester's Program Director of
Resource Recovery Systems added:
We always considered a private developer. We had a
lot of faith in Wheelabrator. Some city councilors
sought revenue sharing, but they were not willing to
accept the risks of shortfalls.
In early 1984, Wheelabrator approached the Committee and
proposed to finance the facility's preconstruction process which
included studies for the environmental impact review,
permitting, and the purchase of land, with an aggregate value
of $1 million, for exclusive rights of consideration as the
project vendor for six months. At the end of this period,
Wheelabrator would determine the feasibility of the project,
propose contractual agreements, and propose tipping fees.
Concurrently, the Committee developed a short list of qualified
vendors, established a preference for the mass burn technology,
and proceeded to develop a RFP which served to exert competitive
pressure on Wheelabrator.
After the six month period, Wheelabrator offered to design,
build, operate and own a 650 Tons per Day (TPD) facility and
proposed tipping fees of $28.00/ton (1988). Worcester, being
the largest potential supplier of waste stream, withheld
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acceptance and sought a larger facility to ensure greater
commercial disposal capability. Wheelabrator responded with a
subsequent proposal for a larger 1500 TPD facility and proposed
tipping fees of $24.50/ton (1988) with an annual fee escalation
based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Wheelabrator assumed
the financial risk of waste flow undercommitment, since at that
time bankers required guaranteed flow control of 65% of capacity
(975 TPD) and the communities could only commit 650 TPD.
Wheelabrator's proposal also provided for a local transfer
station on the site of the plant to accommodate Worcester's
disposal needs between the period of the landfill closure of
June, 1985 and the facility's opening in January, 1988. After
the opening, the transfer station would remain in use to handle
demolition wastes. On an emergency basis, the station would
serve as back up to the resource recovery facility. The
Committee agreed to Wheelabrator's second offer for a larger
facility (through a non-competitive negotiation process) because
it addressed the urgency of the region's current and future
needs.
Approval of the non-competitive procurement process from
the Massachusetts Inspector General was necessary. The State
attempted to impose its control over the implementation process
of the facility. Schnorff expressed:
The State's opposition reinforced our alliance with
one another. Public administrators often forget their
real role as policy makers and facilitators. The
Committee was a successful example of regionalism.
The Committee was composed of a group of people,
despite a history of not trusting each other, who
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were dedicated to solving a problem on a regional
basis.
For Wheelabrator, the market was favorable and private
control allowed the project to be completed ahead of schedule
(September 1987) and below budget. Wheelabrator's
responsibilities included: to build and operate a resource
recovery facility; to secure a separate 20 year service
agreement with each community, including a guarantee from each
community to provide a minimum tonnage of waste per year; to
comply with performance guarantees in the service agreements; to
secure environmental licenses and permits required for
construction and operation of both the plant and the landfill;
to comply with environmental performance requirements; to
contract with New England Power Co. for the sale of electricity
generated by the facility; and to construct and operate an ash
residue monofill which is located in Shrewsbury. The
municipalities were responsible for conditions resulting from
force majeure events and changes in law.
The service agreement between Wheelabrator and Millbury
provides the town with free tipping for up to 11,315 tons of
solid waste a year. Beyond that amount, Millbury pays the
current per ton rate. In addition to free tipping, Millbury
receives "host community fees" for waste processed at the
facility on a per-ton basis. Two state laws facilitated the
agreement: a state statute enabling municipalities to create
industrial development finance authorities to issue bonds and a
1981 state law that requires payment of "host community fee"
from communities delivering waste to a facility. The additional
cost of "host community fees" and free tipping for Millbury are
built into the tipping fees of the other participating
communities.
Wheelabrator obtained private financing to purchase the
land and to construct the facility with capital costs of
approximately $160 million (1986). Taxable private financing
was preferred to take advantage of the available investment tax
credit. TRA 86 reduced the tax benefits of ownership for
Wheelabrator, while ownership offered tax advantages for Ford
Motor Credit company. As a result, Wheelabrator undertook a
leveraged lease transaction in which they sold the facility to
the Ford Motor Credit Company and then leased the facility back.
Case Two: Quonset Point, Rhode Island
The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation
(Corporation), created in 1974, has been in the process of
developing a resource recovery facility at Quonset Point since
1983. Initially, the Corporation attempted to develop a
comprehensive program which maximized resource recovery and
recycling, and encouraged private industry to actively
participate in the development of the Corporation's programs.
As a result of extensive political debate, legislation was
enacted that mandated public ownership. Blount Energy Resource
Corp. (Blount) of Birmingham, AL. has been contracted by the
Corporation to design, construct and operate the facility.
After years of planning, the project is awaiting final
environmental permits. Construction ground breaking is
anticipated by the end of 1989.
By 1970, there were 43 disposal facilities within the State
of Rhode Island. As more and more communities exhausted their
landfill capacity or closed their disposal facilities for
environmental or economic reasons, only 12 facilities were in
operation by 1984. The existing landfills had a limited
capacity and did not provide for long-term disposal of solid
waste. Neighboring states faced a similar long-term disposal
problem.
The Corporation was established as a public, tax-exempt
corporation with the appropriate powers and responsibilities to
plan, finance, and implement an integrated, statewide system of
solid waste management. Municipal participation in the
statewide system was voluntary, provided that the municipality
made effective solid waste disposal arrangements within its own
geographic boundaries. Any revenue received by the Corporation
was to provide for its own financial support to maintain
financial solvency.
In 1984, the Corporation designated a 20 acre site at the
Quonset Point/Davisville Industrial Park for the resource
recovery facility. The site was owned by the Rhode Island Port
Authority and Economic Development Corp, a state entity, which
planned to sell or lease the site to the Corporation. The
site's advantages included a central location, zoning for heavy
industry, close proximity to large steam users and the landfill,
and expansion capacity. The 600 acre Central landfill was
purchased as an integral first component to the Corporation's
proposed long-term centralized waste management program.
Blount submitted a proposal to the Corporation in April,
1983 to design, construct, and operate a 1500 TPD resource
recovery facility to be owned jointly by the Corporation. and
Blount. Blount proposed to provide 25% of construction cost as
equity capital, which decreased the amount of financing required
and resulted in lower tipping fees for individual communities
and haulers.
In December, 1984 (to avoid the restrictions of TRA 86),
the State of Rhode Island sold revenue bonds of $226 Million
and placed the monies in escrow to finance a private deal. Flow
control, i.e. ownership of the solid waste which assured a
reliable and permanent waste flow, was necessary to secure
bondholders. Legislative mandate for flow control was reviewed
by the Rhode Island Special House Commission of Resource
Recovery (Commission) and subsequently adopted in 1986. During
the review period, Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Westinghouse) of
Pittsburgh, PA., submitted an alternate proposal to the
Corporation. Westinghouse's proposal included three publicly
owned regional facilities with a combined capacity of 1500 TPD
and all energy revenues to be allocated to the Corporation.
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Westinghouse defended their regional proposal as more cost
effective due to reduced transportation costs.
The Corporation initially preferred private equity
participation because it was perceived to be more cost effective
on a short-term basis. However, some legislators did not favor
a private equity deal. Under the terms of the public/private
partnership, Blount would own the facility after the 20 year
service contract. The anticipated life cycle of a facility is
at least 30 years. Subsequent legislative amendments mandated
public ownership, reversing the initial legislative intent of
encouraging private industry participation.
The Commission, under advisement from technical and
financial consultants, determined that Westinghouse's proposal
was not more cost effective than Blount's proposal, and that a
smaller facility would meet the state's needs. The Corporation
then entered into negotiations with Blount for a 710 TPD
facility under public ownership. Mr. Dante Ionata, Project
Coordinator for the Corporation described the process:
State ownership was mandated, because Blount was
perceived as getting a free ride at the expense of the
public since the state was extending its credit to
secure tax-exempt bonds. The Commission had a number
of issues with public versus private ownership which
were fueled by media and political intimacies. The
issue of ownership had less to do with the decision
than with the politician's perceptions and fears.
The Commission was aware that public ownership would result
in higher users' costs due to additional financing required, but
they were determined to eliminate the potential of price gouging
for the disposal services upon reversion of facility ownership.
Under the private equity participation, Blount would own the
facility after 20 years, at which time the capital costs and
debt service would be paid for. Ionata expressed:
We came to the right decision, public ownership, for
all the wrong reasons. Public ownership is best in
terms of long-term economic return to the end user.
Short-term economics favor a private deal.
After years of public hearings with environmentalists and
concerned citizens, the resource recovery facility at Quonset
Point is still in the permitting stages. Ionata anticipates the
construction ground breaking of the $72 million (1987) facility
by the end of 1989 with a three year construction build-out.
The proposed tipping fees upon operation will be $65/ton (1992).
To allay environmental concerns, an additional $6 million (1987)
will be spent on state-of-the-art environmental controls and
associated air quality monitoring equipment.
Under the provisions of the contract, Blount will receive
an annual fee to operate and maintain the publicly owned
facility. Blount will be eligible for an incentive bonus that
will be shared with the state on a equal basis if it operates
the facility beyond the stipulated contract guarantees.
Revenues generated from the sale of steam and electricity
produced by the plant will be used by the Corporation to lower
disposal costs for other Rhode Island communities.
The Corporation is in the advanced planning stages of two
additional resource recovery facilities. Ogden Martin Systems
of Fairfield, N.J. has been contracted to design, construct and
operate a 750 TPD facility in Johnston, R.I. The project is
awaiting final permits and anticipates ground breaking in the
1990. The third facility is proposed for Blackstone Valley,
R.I. The Corporation is currently in the vendor negotiation
process for this 750 TPD facility.
Case Three: Pennsauken, New Jersey
The Township of Pennsauken, New Jersey and eight adjoining
municipalities in Camden County have been relying on the
Pennsauken Sanitary Landfill (Landfill) since 1978 for solid
waste disposal. In 1981, it became clear that the Landfill was
a limited resource. The Township and the adjoining
municipalities created the Pennsauken Solid Waste Management
Authority (Authority) in September, 1983. The Authority has
contracted Ogden Martin Systems (Ogden) of Fairfield, N.J., to
design, build, operate, and maintain a resource recovery
facility. Construction had begun, only to be stopped by legal
action (1989). Once resolved, construction build-out is
expected to be approximately thirty months.
In the State of New Jersey, solid waste generation and
disposal is regulated at multiple levels of authority by state,
county, and municipal laws. In 1985, New Jersey adopted two
acts, The McEnroe Bill and the N.J. Mandatory Source Separation
and Recycling Act. The legislative objectives are to implement
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a safe and efficient statewide solid waste and resource recovery
management strategy, and to reduce dependence on sanitary
landfills as a primary means of solid waste disposal. These two
acts require counties and municipalities to enact specific
legislation for the establishment of solid waste management
districts. Under this legislation, two or more municipalities
may plan and establish a regional resource recovery facility, or
individual municipalities may operate their own facility.
The Authority was created to select a competent system
supplier, to arrange for a dedicated solid waste stream, to
market recovered materials and energy, to obtain environmental
permits, to finance project construction, and to operate the
Landfill. The Authority conducted a feasibility analysis of
various solid waste processing technologies intended to preserve
the disposal capabilities of the Landfill for a minimum of 20
years.
Although the project was conceived in 1979, it took another
five years before a RFQ was issued. Mr. John Jacobs, Executive
Director of the Authority offered the following explanation for
the delay:
There are two types of politicians, those who act and
those who react. Too many politicians react which was
the case in Pennsauken. Two incumbent councilmen who
were in favor of waste-to-energy were defeated by
opponents who won on anti-waste-to-energy platforms.
The two anti-waste-to-energy councilmen subsequently
lost their seats and the project was rejuvenated.
Fourteen firms responded to the RFQ, but only two firms,
Ogden and Foster Wheeler (Foster) of Livingston, N.J., were
shortlisted to submit proposals. The Authority had specified
public ownership of the facility and the mass burn technology in
the RFP. Jacobs expressed:
We always wanted control of the project. We were
bothered by vendors willing to put up 20%-25% of the
equity in return for ownership of the plant upon
expiration of the service contract. These plants have
more than a 20 year life cycle if operated and
maintained properly. We don't have the expertise to
run the facility. We always sought a long-term
depository for solid waste. We did not want to give
up the value of a fully functional facility because it
would be an asset to the community upon completion and
in the future.
Mr. Dan Spech, Project Manager for Ogden added:
Decision on ownership is [usually] made prior to
issuing the RFP. With a public deal, the governmental
body is on your side. It's one more piece of clout
which may prove helpful in the permitting process.
With merchant plants [solely private], the NIMBY
opposition could kill the deal. Development expenses
are at your own risk. The merchant developer must
offer the host community benefits to mitigate
opposition.
In April, 1988, the Authority contracted with Ogden to
operate, maintain, and guarantee the performance of the
facility, and guarantee the generation of electricity for sale
on behalf of the Authority in consideration for an annual
service fee. Ogden undertook the lead role in securing
environmental permits for the facility. Ogden is also
responsible for transporting the bypass waste and ash residue to
the Landfill at cost. Should the plant not operate, Ogden would
be responsible for the disposal of the waste for the 20 year
length of the contract. Ogden's 10% share of the energy
revenues, is perceived by Jacobs as providing a sufficient
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incentive to run the plant efficiently.
The Authority has secured a solid waste disposal franchise
from the N.J. Board of Public Utilities to ensure a solid waste
supply. The franchised municipalities will be the exclusive
users of the facility [The County of Camden is currently
developing a 1050 TPD facility to serve all other communities in
the county since the Authority was conceived prior to state the
law]. The Authority also has executed a power purchase contract
with Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) for the
generated electricity. The Authority has successfully operated
the Landfill since its obligation began.
The 500 TPD facility will be located on a 3.5 acre site
within the boundaries of the existing Landfill property. The
site is owned by the Township and leased to the Authority. The
site is zoned consistent with its use as a resource recovery
facility and has good accessibility to the PSE&G electrical grid
and to the area's highway system. Residue waste and ash will be
disposed of at the Landfill.
The construction of the $55 million (1988) facility will be
financed with proceeds from industrial revenue bonds that were
sold and placed in escrow (pre-TRA 86). The Authority expects
to derive the revenues necessary to operate the facility and the
Landfill from the electric power generation sales, recovered
materials sales, and tipping fees. Anticipated tipping fees are
in the range of $90/ton (1992).
Construction had started, but was stopped pending the
outcome of litigation brought by adjacent communities which
allege that they are not deriving benefit from the facility.
Upon issuance of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Permit by the N.J. Department of Environmental Protection,
adjacent communities appealed the decision to the EPA on the
basis of potential leachate contamination. Jacobs expressed his
exasperation:
The American public has the misconception that they
dispose of quality wholesome trash. Lead and heavy
metals are found in newsprint. Batteries contain
mercury, lead and cadmium. Ash is more controllable
than trash. Construction should have continued
pending the resolution of the litigation. The
regulatory agencies don't care about the rate payers
since they will bear the burden of the delay. It
takes strong leadership to bring the issues to the
public and ask for their input and assistance.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
Minicase Data
Each public sector authority was specifically established
to address the issue of solid waste disposal. Landfills were
reaching capacity and were not envisioned as a long-term
solution. The degree of urgency to implement a cost effective,
alternate form of waste disposal determined the rate at which
the facilities were implemented. The level of government at
which the development was undertaken directly influenced the
timeliness of the project's implementation.
In the case of the facility in Millbury, MA., both the Town
of Millbury and the City of Worcester were faced with the
imminent closure of their landfills due to exhausted capacity
and environmental non-compliance, respectively. In addition,
Worcester's constituency had voted to prohibit the siting of
landfills and resource recovery facilities within its
boundaries. The short-term alternative was to transport the
waste to transfer stations, other disposal facilities and
landfills outside the region at a considerable expense. The
absence of an economical long-term solution was a major impetus
for the project's timely implementation. Another determinant
was the "shared vision" of the 35 communities who were served by
the facility. The state's withdrawal of funds, and its
opposition to sole source negotiations reinforced the alliance
among the communities. This alliance provided the forward
momentum necessary to facilitate the contractual process.
At the time of negotiations, Wheelabrator was a proven
vendor with a successful track record. Wheelabrator had five
large-scale facilities in operation throughout the country.
Their first facility, located in Saugus, MA., had been
continuously operating since 1975. The Committee was confident
of Wheelabrator's technical and financial ability. When the
state withdrew its funding, a former consultant to the City of
Worcester was retained by Wheelabrator. He had been involved
from the early stages of planning and had gained the respect of
the Committee members. He subsequently played an integral role
in the negotiations between the communities and Wheelabrator.
The Committee chose Wheelabrator under sole source
procurement with guarantees of receiving a fair economic
benefits package. Wheelabrator proposed host community fees of
$1 per processed ton and free tipping to Millbury, guaranteed
tipping fees to other participating communities that were lower
than the available alternatives, and residue landfill fees to
Shrewsbury. Wheelabrator drew on its past experience to gain
efficiencies in the design, construction, financing, and
operation of the facility. By assuming greater financial risk
for the undercommitment of waste flow of the 1500 TPD project,
Wheelabrator was able to capture a lucrative market share from
the rapidly expanding commercial activity which resulted from
the "Massachusetts Miracle." The pricing structure also
reflected Wheelabrator's ability to take advantage of the
investment tax credit which can be viewed as a federal tax
subsidy. When TRA 86 eliminated this subsidy, Wheelabrator was
quick to respond by selling the facility to Ford Motor Credit.
In summary, the timely implementation of the project was
facilitated by a combination of factors: the participating
communities' commitment to resolve a common problem
collectively; Wheelabrator's ability as a proven vendor to
guarantee levels of service and environmental compliance; the
economic benefits to their communities' through long-term, cost
effective tipping fees; and the compensation package to the host
communities of Millbury and Shrewsbury to mitigate the potential
inconveniences its citizens.
The development of the resource recovery facility at
Ouonset Point, R.I. was conceived as a statewide solution to the
solid waste disposal dilemma. All communities within the state
were considered to be within reasonable hauling distance of
Quonset Point. Although the closure of landfills limited
disposal options, the Corporation could rely on the 600 acre
Central Landfill as an alternative. Thus, there was not a
pressing urgency to implement disposal.
As a quasi-public authority, the Corporation was vested
with the responsibility of providing cost effective, reliable,
long-term waste disposal. Quonset Point was the first resource
recovery facility proposed, and as a result, the statewide
political and environmental decision making frameworks were not
in place. Therefore, the implementation process was susceptible
to citizen opposition and political debate over a range of
project issues-from ownership and vendor selection to flow
control and siting.
The legislators determined that public ownership and
consequently, control of the facility would ensure that the
Corporation's responsibilities would be met. The issue of the
facility being a long-term asset also influenced the legislation
enacted that mandated public ownership.
The initial proposal in 1983 for a 1500 TPD facility was
sized to meet the needs of the state. The siting of a sole
statewide facility drew much opposition from communities who did
not want to be the depository for all the state's waste. To
compound this issue, the Corporation had not offered "host
community benefits" which may have diffused some opposition.
Subsequent reform legislation passed in June, 1989, established
siting guidelines with the intent of diminishing NIMBY
opposition and control of future projects.
Ionata described the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Protection as "leaderless," in the context of
awaiting final permits after five years.
When Blount, the chosen vendor, was in the negotiation
process with the Corporation, its first facility was under
construction. Thus, Blount's inexperience made them vulnerable
when their track record and credibility were questioned with
regards to a public/private consideration. Their inexperience
resulted with the state being open to consider other proposals,
e.g. Westinghouse. At the time, Westinghouse, also did not have
an operating facility, but they were perceived as having
unlimited financial resources should problems arise. Although
Westinghouse's proposal was not accepted, the recommendation of
smaller regional facilities was considered and .adopted.
Currently, the state generates 4,000 to 4500 TPD of solid waste.
The state has enacted a mandatory recycling law which has
targeted 30% attainment for recyclable and 50% attainment for
combustion. Hence, plans for two additional resource recovery
facilities are underway.
Blount's initial proposal of a public/private partnership
proposed tipping fees of $5.50/ton (1985). This low fee
reflected the benefits anticipated from investment tax credits,
tax-exempt financing, lower interest rates, guaranteed flow
control and economies of scale for a 1500 TPD facility. The
anticipated tip fee of $65/ton (1992) reflects the higher
development, financing, and construction costs for the 710 TPD
facility, which resulted from delays experienced during the
implementation process when decision making frameworks were
still being developed.
The Authority in the case of the Pennsauken, N.J. project
undertook the planning for a regional solution prior to the
enactment of state legislation that required all counties to
develop and implement a solid waste management plan. The
limited life span of the existing landfill provided the impetus
for the municipalities to collectively take action.
The Authority had stipulated public ownership from the
outset, since they were cognizant of the long-term value of
these facilities beyond the initial term of the service
agreement and had procured the financing pre-TRA 86. The
Authority acknowledged their inexperience in developing and
operating a facility and undertook the traditional procurement
process of preparing a RFQ and a RFP. Proposals from two
vendors with proven track records for the design, construction
and operation of the facility were considered. The selected
vendor, Ogden, is one of the largest market share leaders in the
resource recovery industry. At the time of consideration, the
resource recovery industry had matured and the probability of
technological risks was perceived as minimal.
Since the facility was sited at the existing Landfill,
which is owned by the Township, the issue of siting did not play
a controversial role. The project was delayed by political
orchestration on a local level. Some councilmen viewed the
development process as a vehicle for political advancement. Two
councilmen won their seats on the anti-waste-to-energy platform,
but subsequently lost them. Once the state enacted legislation
and provided guidelines and a framework to develop resource
recovery facilities, the project was rejuvenated.
Although, siting was not a controversial issue within the
region which the facility will be served, adjacent communities
have stopped the construction by appealing the state's
permitting decision to the EPA on the basis of potential
leachate contamination. This may be attributable to Pennsauken
acting before the statewide framework was established. The
facility will service a relatively small catchment area of 9
communities. The proposed tipping fees of $90/ton reflects the
economies of scale not available for a 500 TPD facility (Table
1). A 1050 TPD facility to serve the remaining communities
within the county is currently in the permitting stage of
development process.
Table 1
PROJECT ECONOMICS
Proiect Capacity(TPD) Capital Costs (YR)
Millbury, MA 1500 $160 million (86)
Quonset, RI 710 78 million (87)
Pennsauken, NJ 500 55 million (88)
Tip Fee/Ton (YR)
$24.50 (86)
65.00 (92)
90.00 (92)
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The demand for responsible solutions for the solid waste
disposal crisis is expanding. A critical determinant of the
timeliness of response to the problem, is the nature of the
emergency- the urgency with which an alternative is sought.
One of the key criterion to the successful development of
a resource recovery project is the existence of a decision
making framework to facilitate the implementation. The
framework may be as a result of state or local legislation
governing management of solid waste or of ad hoc committees
created for the purpose of solving the disposal problem. With
the structural framework in place, municipalities are more
likely to cooperate with one another and to resolve problems on
a regional basis. An example of state legislation which led to
successful project implementation can be found in the State of
New Jersey. In 1985, New Jersey adopted two acts which required
counties and municipalities to enact specific legislation for
the establishments of solid waste management districts. Among
the twenty-two counties in the state, one resource recovery
facility is in operation, four projects are under construction,
seven are awaiting final permitting, and seven are in the
preliminary planning stages.
With a structural framework in place, municipal officials
can distance themselves from the political volatility of the
issue. As a practical matter, municipal officials realize that
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they will be held responsible for problems that occur. To gain
the support and commitment of the general populace and
environmentalists for resource recovery facilities, waste
disposal authorities must overcome the NIMBY syndrome and ease
health concerns by involving more participants in the planning
processes and by justifying planning decisions with documented
evidence of benefits and guaranties. Financial incentives to
host communities may increase support for siting regional
projects.
It's not that we won friends, it's that we didn't make
enemies. You never win friends for resource recovery.
You just have to demonstrate that you've minimized the
unfairness (Stains, 1987).
Benjamin Miller
Director of Public Policy
New York City's Office of Resource Recovery
The trend towards municipal development and ownership of
resource recovery facilities has been influenced by state and
local regulations governing the management of solid waste.
These regulations can determine the priorities of municipal
ownership which include the assurance of environmental
compliance and the control of the quality of service and of the
pricing.
During the industry's infancy stage, public officials
lacked the expertise necessary to develop a facility and relied
heavily on private industry participation. The technological
advantage of private vendors has diminished with the maturation
of the resource recovery industry which further reinforces the
trend toward public ownership.
Solid waste disposal isn't a technological problem,
it's a political problem. Plants are like landfills
if you have to locate a new landfill, you become the
villain very quickly. Politically, your best decision
for survival is to postpone the decision. The biggest
thing is making up your mind and doing it. You can't
make everybody happy (Stains, 1987).
Richard Trainor
Baltimore Director of Transportation
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) reduced the economic
benefits of privately owned projects through the elimination of
investment tax credits and the lengthened depreciation period,
which further supports the trend towards public ownership.
The successful implementation of resource recovery projects
is dependent upon the skills and tools available to committed
public officials involved in designing and executing the
development process.
APPENDIX A
MASS BURN AND REFUSE DERIVED FUEL TECHNOLOGIES
Mass Burn technology has been in existence for over 50
years and has proven to be a reliable means for volume reduction
and energy recovery from solid waste. Most of the resource
recovery facilities being designed today are based largely on
technology obtained by license agreements from German and Swiss
companies. Mass burn technology involves the combustion of
solid waste, using boilers with a waterwall enclosed radiant
section to recover the heat set free by the combustion. The
combustion process produces steam which, when passed through a
power generation train, generates electricity.
Typically, the entire plant will be enclosed in a single
building to prevent emission of odors and to effect an efficient
and clean operation. Solid waste is dumped by incoming garbage
trucks into a refuse pit (no prior sorting or shredding of the
waste is required), the waste is transferred to the feed hopper
of each furnace, the waste is then moved on horizontal grates
through the furnace (Figure 1). The furnace fires the waste at
temperatures exceeding 2500 *F on the horizontal grates without
auxiliary fuel (except for the initial startup), air from the
refuse pit area is blown in above and below the grates to assure
that the waste is completely burned. The temperature is high
enough to destroy many volatile organic chemicals, including
some solvents and polychlorinated biphenyls. The heat from the
furnace is used to heat water in a boiler above the grates to
produce steam. Steam can be used directly or can drive a
turbine generator to produce electricity.
The ash that is left from the combustion process (bottom
ash) is further processed to remove the remaining metal
components. The resultant product can be used for a variety of
concrete products, lightweight fill material, cinder, blocks,
gravel substitutes and aggregate for asphalt. The refuse pit is
designed to hold a supply of waste for four to five days fuel
capacity for plant operation with emergency capability. This
ensures continuous operation over weekends and holidays when
waste is not delivered.
Acid gas scrubbers, fabric filters, and electrostatic
precipitators are employed in any combination to thoroughly
clean flue gas emissions to meet stringent environmental
regulations. Dry scrubbers will remove acid gas components
(preventing acid rain), dioxin and dangerous heavy metals (such
as lead). Solid particles in the flue gas exiting the spray
dryer are collected by electrostatic precipitator or by a fabric
filter/baghouse. The electrostatic precipitator utilizes
electric forces to remove particles suspended in the gas by
charging the particles and separating them from the gas by means
of an electric field. A series of fabric filters, which
function like immense vacuum cleaner bags, trap dust by
impingement. Filter fabrics or baghouses must be cleaned after
a fixed operating period. The solid particles consist of
reaction products and the fly ash. The cleaned flue gas leaves
the collection device and is exhausted through the stack.
The ash collected by the pollution control devices amounts
to only 5% by weight of the original waste. This fly ash is
neutralized and stabilized for disposal along with the bottom
ash. Future plants will mainly rely on the baghouse/scrubber
air pollution control systems, which are more effective and more
expensive. In addition, some planned facilities are reporting
the use of nitrogen oxide removal systems.
Refuse derived fuel (RDF) technology was developed in the
U.S. as an alternative to the mass burn technology. RDF
technology is driven by goals of providing more efficient, more
load responsive and more economical boiler facilities coupled
with a capability to recycle recovered materials (Figure 2).
RDF also provides flexibility to collect and process waste at
one location and to incinerate the beneficiated waste at another
location.
Preliminary sorting and recovery begins when the solid
waste arrives at the plant. Oversized items, such as
refrigerators, mattresses, etc. are removed for separate
processing. Solid waste is fed by conveyor into a shredder,
which reduces the average size of the refuse to three inches or
less. The shredding process makes the solid waste a much more
uniform and efficient fuel. Shredded waste is passed under a
magnetic separator which removes 90% of the ferrous materials
for recycling. The remaining 10% is removed from the ash after
incineration. The shredded waste then becomes a fuel which is
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blown into a specially designed boiler. Light materials, such
as paper and plastic remain airborne and burn at the hottest
point in the boiler (2500 OF). Heavier components drop to the
bottom, where they land on slow moving grate that gives them
more time to burn. The ash discharged from the bottom of the
boiler is sterile, inert material amounting to only 20% of the
original waste by weight.
Steam produced by the plant is passed through a turbine to
drive a generator which produces electricity. A portion of the
steam can be extracted to be used as process steam for
neighboring industries. Air pollution controls for RDF
facilities are similar to those used at mass burn facilities.
APPENDIX B
SOURCES OF CAPITAL FUNDS
The major sources of capital funds used individually or in
combination to finance resource recovery facilities, are
general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, industrial revenue
(IDR) bonds, and private equity. The trend in planned
facilities has been toward the use of IDR bonds and private
equity. Public forms of financing, however, are now beginning
to be used more frequently, due to recent changes in the tax
code which have limited tax-exempt bond issues. The Tax
Reduction Act of 1986 (TRA 86) eliminated the investment tax
credit for private vendors, lengthened the period of
depreciation, retained the volume cap. on tax-exempt bonds,
including IDR bonds, and placed new limitations on IDR bonds.
A publicly owned project can be financed with general
obligation bonds or revenue bonds.
General obligation bonds are supported by the general tax
revenues of a community. Financing with general obligation
bonds combines the capital requirement of the project with other
current municipal needs. The community pledges to collect
sufficient tax revenue to meet debt service payments in a timely
manner irrespective of the performance of the project for which
the bond funds are used. The municipality holds an election, or
referendum to determine whether or not the taxpayers support the
issue. When the issue goes to referendum, the residents may be
voting upon their overall impression of the local administration
as well as the specific project involved. Should the bonds gain
taxpayers support, the municipality then brings the bond issue
to the tax free municipal bond market. The bonds are sold on
the basis of the municipality's credit rating. The municipality
develops a prospectus which discusses the project, demonstrates
the legality of the issue through bond counsel opinion, and
demonstrates the financial responsibility of the municipality,
region, or county to pay off the obligations.
Some obstacles may surface with general obligation
financing. The use of general obligation bonds impedes the
ability of a municipality to build additional facilities such as
schools and firehouses. The municipality must carefully
evaluate its capital needs when evaluating the financing
options. Municipalities with marginal credit ratings may not
receive financing at low interest rates through this mechanism.
Revenue bonds are supported by the revenues of the project
for which the bond funds are used. The project is treated as a
cost/revenue center, separate and apart from general tax
revenues. On the bond market, revenue bonds are judged on the
merits of the project itself. Revenue bonds do not consume any
of the municipality's tax supported borrowing capacity since it
stands on its own. They do not impede the ability of a
community to finance other capital projects. The use of revenue
bond financing requires additional scrutiny of agreements since
the bondholder must be convinced that the project will earn
sufficient revenue to allow for timely repayment of debt.
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Industrial development bonds are those bonds in which the
revenue from private users constitutes more than 15% of the
total revenue securing the bonds. Industrial development
revenue bond financing has become less attractive as a means of
project financing because of the cap placed on funds available
to states per capita, as well as limits placed on tax exemptions
for certain aspects of the project.
Project financing relies only on the revenues generated by
the facility for payment of debt service. The revenues that can
be derived from the sale of energy is large relative to the
revenues received from tipping fees paid at the gate.
Therefore, except where the energy purchaser, is, itself a tax
exempt entity, the likelihood that the private user percentage
will be exceeded is great. A municipality can avoid having its
resource recovery financing declared IDR by owning the facility,
by adopting a system revenue approach whereby collection,
disposal, and energy revenues all support system bonds, or by
selling the energy derived from the facility to a tax exempt
user if possible.
The key element of a system based revenue bond financing is
that the municipality would assume responsibility for all
disposal activities in its region. A system financing would
provide for on-going disposal operations and revenue flows,
regardless of interruption of operations to any component of the
system.
The municipality establishes user fees to generate
sufficient revenues to cover the cost of operating and
maintaining all the components of the solid waste management
system. The municipality pledges the entire revenue stream from
its solid waste collection, disposal, and energy production
activities to the payment of principal, premium, and interest on
bonds issued for the entire capital needs of the system. Along
with the revenue pledge is a covenant to raise rates to satisfy
certain predetermined debt service coverage requirements.
A privately owned facility can be financed with a
combination of debt and equity. In return for its financial
commitment to the project, the project owner becomes eligible
for certain federal tax benefits which enhance the return on its
investment and reduce the overall cost of the project. In the
private ownership case, the facility stands alone as a
cost/revenue center and the revenue bond is the appropriate debt
instrument to be used in raising all the capital which is not
contributed in the form of an equity investment.
The bond rating agencies may require put or pay contracts,
annual residential disposal assessments or general obligation
pledges as the basic form of security for bondholders depending
on the strength of the local waste flow control ordinances.
The combination of equity and debt is largely a factor of
ownership and municipal requirements. Creditworthiness, project
economics, the sponsor's preference, availability of tax
benefits and availability of state industrial development bond
volume cap also affect the financing available.
Other financing options include: partial federal or state
grant; current revenues; carry over fund balances; low interest
loans; and tax-exempt leases. The municipality can also
subsidize solid waste disposal through investment credits;
lowered interest rates on capital investments; tax breaks;
unrestricted monetary allocations; restricted or earmarked
allocations; matching funds, use of materials, equipment or
personnel; and use of land and capital facilities.
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
1. What motivated you to undertake the development of a
resource recovery facility?
2. Who initiated the need for the facility?
3. How did you determine the valuative process?
4. What were your objectives?
5. What benefits do you receive?
6. Who bears the risks of unexpected failures?
7. What common issues or concerns surfaced?
8. How do you monitor the facility's performance,
technically and financially?
9. How does the form of ownership affect the existing
financial structure?
10. Does the facility meet the capital needs of the area
served?
11. Will the facility meet the future needs of the area?
12. How do you ensure that it does or will?
13. Does revenue sharing exist?
14. How was revenue sharing determined?
15. What type of procurement process was used? Why?
16. Does the public need control?
17. If so, control of what issues?
18. Is the public protected from price gouging?
19. Are you satisfied with your decisions?
20. What insights can you share with others who plan to
develop a facility?
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